Australia"s wine industry has been through major structural changes over the past six decades and has grown especially rapidly since the early 1990s. Investments in generic promotion and in grape and wine research and development have been significant features of the industry throughout that period, and have grown in importance following the formation in the early 1990s of the Australian Wine Export Council and the Grape and Wine R&D Corporation which coordinates the investing of grapegrower and winemaker national levies and matching federal government funding for such generic promotion and R&D. This paper summarizes that recent history, and concludes by speculating on the scope for and likely approaches to innovation in the future. This paper seeks to assess the roles that innovation system has played in the industry"s recent growth, particularly through generic promotion and R&D. It begins with a brief summary of salient features of the industry"s long-run trends and cycles and especially its most recent growth spurt. It then lays out the evolving nature of the institutions that provided generic promotion and R&D outputs of relevance to the industry. The speed and success of the export take-off in the 1990s was due in no small part to the substantial prior and on-going investments nationally in pertinent research and development and related education and 2 extension activities. The paper concludes by speculating on the scope for enhancing the roles of generic and firm-level promotion and R&D in the future of the Australian wine industry.
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Growth of the Australian wine industry: a brief history
It was claimed more than 100 years ago that "Many of the leading wine merchants of London and other important commercial centres admit that Australia promises to become a powerful rival in the world"s markets with the old-established vineyards of Europe" (Irvine 1892, p. 6 ).
Even though another seven decades passed before the Australian wine industry began to fulfil that earlier promise, it has since shot into prominence. Domestic demand growth from the 1960s helped, but since 1990 Australia has trebled its share of global vine area and has raised its share of global export sales more than eight-fold. Following the quadrupling of its output it is now the world"s fifth largest wine producer by volume and the fourth largest by value (after France, Italy and Spain and ahead of Argentina -see OIV 2009 ).
In the decade to the mid-1980s, Australian wine exports were less than US$15 million per year and the country was a net importer of wine. By contrast, nearly two-thirds of Australia"s much larger volume of wine is now sold abroad (Figure 1 ), valued at around US$2.5 to 3 billion. Wine now generates about the same export revenue for Australia as the dairy industry and next behind the country"s two biggest farm export items (beef and wheat), having recently displaced wool from that third position.
Australia"s wine exports have boomed several times in the past. In each case those booms subsequently plateaued and the expanded acreage meant grapegrowers and winemakers went back to receiving low returns. Indeed the industry"s prospects were sufficiently dire as recently as 1985 as to induce the government to fund a vine-pull compensation scheme to encourage grapegrowers to move to alternative crops. Yet, like a phoenix, the industry has risen again and grown with renewed vigour and a strong export focus.
The long history of fluctuating fortunes gave reason to expect Australia"s latest wine boom would be followed by yet another crash, at least in wine export (and thus winegrape) prices if not in wine production and export volumes -as indeed has begun to happen ( Figure   2 ), with the export volumes rising since 2002 only for the two cheapest price ranges ( Figure   3 ). Each of the first four booms in the Australian wine industry finished with a plateau in vineyard area (and winery output) growth. These were periods when returns to grapegrowers and often also winemakers were depressed for years because of the rapid growth in new plantings during the boom. This phenomenon is of course not unique to Australia. On the contrary, it has periodically been the case in grape and wine markets elsewhere in the world for at least two millennia (see Johnson 1989 ).
Yet the industry"s past history also is encouraging, because it shows the current boom to have several positive features that contrast with those of earlier booms. Some of these features are summarized in Table 1 . The first boom, from the mid-1850s, was mainly driven by domestic demand growth following the gold rush that induced a trebling in Australia"s white population in the 1850s. However, the wine produced from that excessive expansion was unable to be exported profitably, largely because of high duties on inter-colonial trade within Australasia plus poor marketing and high transport costs in exporting the rather crude product of that time to the Old World. Hence returns slumped quite quickly in that first cycle.
The second boom, from the 1880s, was due to a mixture of domestic and export demand growth, the latter involving better marketing and lower ocean transport costs for what were higher quality but still mostly generic bulk (rather than winery bottled and branded) dry red wines. The relatively open British market absorbed one-sixth of Australia"s production early in the 20 th century, before the first world war intervened. That boom was part of a general internationalization of world commodity markets at that time -something that returned but in much-diminished form after that war.
The acreage boom induced by soldier settlement after World War I provided the basis for the third boom, from the mid-1920s. That third boom was helped by irrigation and land development subsidies, a huge fortified wine export subsidy, and a new 50 per cent imperial tariff preference in the British market for fortified wines. The decline in domestic consumption, induced by the export subsidy and the Great Depression, added to wine exports in the 1930s -which by then accounted for more than one-fifth of production. The subsequent removal of the export subsidy, and the huge hike in UK tariffs on fortified wine in the latter 1940s, then caused a severe decline in export orientation. As well, the return to normal beer consumption after war-induced grain rationing kept down domestic wine sales Australia's per capita wine consumption to treble during the fourth cycle (Table 1 ). The economy-wide recession of the early 1980s subsequently slowed domestic demand growth and caused wine prices to slump to the point that the Federal and South Australian governments intervened with vine-pull subsidies in the mid-1980s. As a result, the national area of vines in 1988 was reduced to that of two decades earlier.
The fifth and latest boom, which began in the late 1980s, differs from the earlier booms in several respects. One difference is that the current boom is overwhelmingly exportoriented (Figure 1 ), since Australia"s per capita wine consumption has been grown very little over the past two decades (despite a one-fifth decline in beer consumption and a nearly 50 percent rise in spirits consumption, to 3.1, 4.6 and 2.3 litres of alcohol, respectively). This contrasts with the first and fourth booms at least, which were primarily domestic. It also differs from the inter-war boom, when exports were more a way of disposing of soldiersettlement induced surplus low-quality winegrape production than a pre-planned development strategy.
Secondly, the current boom is mainly market-driven, which is not unlike the first two booms but contrasts markedly with the third (inter-war) boom that evaporated once government assistance measures (the export subsidy and the preferential UK tariff) were withdrawn. What triggered the growth in export demand for Australian wine was the change in liquor licensing laws in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, allowing supermarkets to retail wine to the post-war baby boomers (by then adults). Given also Australia"s close historical ties with Britain, it is not surprising that Australian companies recognised and responded to this new market opportunity. They were able to do so faster than EU suppliers because the latter have been hamstrung by myriad regulations and insulated from market forces by price supports. To exploit this rapidly growing market required large volumes of consistent, lowpriced branded premium wine. Land-and capital-abundant Australia had the right factor endowments to supply precisely that. High labour costs were overcome for larger firms by adapting and adopting new techniques for mechanical pruning and harvesting, thereby generating large economies of size, especially in warm irrigated areas. That stimulated a number of mergers and acquisitions among Australia"s wine firms that resulted in several large and four very large wine companies. This has provided them the opportunity to reap scale economies not only in grape growing and wine making but also in viticultural and oenological R&D, in innovative brand promotion and related marketing investments, and in distribution including through establishing their own sales offices abroad rather than relying on distributors. It has also enhanced their bargaining power with wholesalers and retailers.
The volumes of grapes grown and purchased from numerous regions by these large firms enable them to provide massive shipments of consistent, popular wines, with little variation from year to year, for the UK and now also North American and German supermarkets. The signing of the EU-Australia Wine Agreement in 1994 provided additional market surety to wine exporters at the outset of that surge in sales to Europe. Indeed some types (e.g., Lindemans Bin 65 Chardonnay) were specifically developed for and only sold in those markets initially, being released in Australia several years later only after there had been a sufficient expansion in production of the required grapes.
The third major difference between now and the past is that the quality of wine output has improved hugely during the past two decades, relative to the cost of production.
Moreover, for the first time, the industry is in a position to build brand, regional, and varietal images abroad to capitalize on those improvements in the quality of its grapes and wines.
That image building has been partly generic, with the help of the Australian Wine Export
Council"s activities in Europe and elsewhere. It has come also from the promotional activities of individual corporations and their local representatives abroad as those firms became everlarger and more multinational via mergers and takeovers during the past dozen or so years.
That promotion has been helped by being able to point to the legislated wine quality standards in the Australian and New Zealand Food Standards Code, and to the fact that Australian wines over-delivered in terms of value for money in Northern Hemisphere markets in the latter 1990s and early this decade before exports from other Southern Hemisphere and Southern European producers began to offer stiffer competition.
And the fourth feature distinguishing the current situation is the quality upgrading that has been taking place in Australia"s domestic as well as export markets. As recently as 1994, two-thirds of domestic sales of Australian wine were in soft packs ("bag-in-a-box") of two to five litres, whose retail price (including the 41 per cent tax) was as low as US$1.40 per litre.
That share now is down to barely one-third, and the average quality of wine in soft packs is considerably greater than in previous decades. The average quality of Australia"s bottled wine sold on the domestic market also has risen steadily since the 1980s. Hence even though 
The innovation system in Australia's wine industry
The ability of a country"s vignerons to compete in global markets depends on the country"s comparative advantage in wine, which changes over time at a rate that depends, among other things, on own-versus other-country technological and institutional innovations (Abramovitz 1986; Nelson 2008; m Cusmano, Morrison and Rabellotti 2010) . Standard international trade theory stresses the importance of resource endowments as the key determinant of comparative advantage at a point in time. The crucial natural resources needed for successful winegrape production include climate, land with the appropriate terroir and, where rain is insufficient, affordable supplemental water. Also essential are skilled viticulturalists and oenologists, and stocks of production knowledge pertinent to their country. The latter can be enhanced by investments in own-country research and development or in adapting imported technologies.
For differentiated products such as wine, consumption patterns also matter. Both at home and abroad, the purchase decisions of consumers are influenced by tastes and preferences. These can be altered to some extent by advertising and through the writings of wine journalists.
Hence skills in marketing, and levels of investment in market knowledge and promotion, also are important in maintaining and improving the international competitiveness of a country"s vignerons.
During the past two decades, the Australian wine industry improved its competitiveness in no small measure by large investments not only in vineyards, wineries and wine marketing but also in the creation and dissemination of production and market knowledge. Plenty of that is done at the firm level, but there are high rewards from supplementing that through collaboration, especially when many firms are new to the industry and when new markets abroad are being targeted. One of the hallmarks of the export-oriented success of Australia"s wine industry since the 1980s has been the very considerable degree of integrated collaboration agreed to among its firms, including in the development of supportive industry-wide institutions to create public goods in the form of generic promotion and R&D.
To build and retain a competitive edge internationally, strategies are needed to obtain and make good use of available information faster and at a lower cost than do competitors, to generate new knowledge pertinent to domestic producers, and to cost-effectively disseminate that among the country"s firms. The information required relates not just to consumer, retailer and distributor demands but also to appropriate new technologies as they affect all aspects of grapegrowing, winemaking, wine marketing and associated financing. Much of the pertinent information and knowledge has a public-good nature. It is that fact, together with the spillovers that can occur from private-firm generation of information through such activities as promotion and technical research, which ensures collaboration between firms within the industry can have a high payoff. We consider firm-level collaboration first, and then collaboration at the industry level and its associated institutional innovations.
Collaboration and innovation at the firm level
Two levels of collaboration between wine firms are important: vertical (that is, between the grapegrower, other input suppliers, the wine maker, and the wine marketer), and horizontal.
The various channels through which it can occur include mergers and acquisitions, but there is also a range of other alliances.
As with so many horticultural products, processing of winegrapes and then marketing/distributing the wine is necessary before the product reaches the final consumer.
Many winegrape producers have chosen to do some or all of those manufacturing and service activities themselves. But there are far more winegrape growers than there are wineries, with the former dependent on the latter to process their highly perishable and virtually noninternationally tradable product. That dependence is not a problem during boom periods, when widespread signing of long-term (up to ten-year) contracts is common so as to enhance security of supply for wineries and security of demand for grapegrowers. But when there is excess supply, as in recent years in Australia, the vulnerability of the non-winemaking grapegrower increases. Even so, the greater emphasis on producing and promoting consistent high-quality wine (with widespread use of price bonuses and penalties according to measured grape quality attributes), and the fact that much of that quality is determined in the vineyard, has ensured the two-way relationships between wineries and contract grapegrowers is more secure now than it was before the present boom (that is, pre-1990s).
Another form of vertical integration is occurring between wine making and wine
marketing. An example is e-commerce, which is lowering the cost, especially for smaller wineries, of using email, the internet and twitter to market their wines directly. Some
Australian firms even experimented with selling their entire release by tender over the internet when prices for premium wines were rising rapidly at the turn of the century. The exemption of small wineries from the Australian Government"s wine sales tax for ownmarketed wines has added to the incentive to explore these new options. Another example is wineries getting involved in tourism, going beyond standard cellar-door activities to restaurant and entertainment services.
Turning to horizontal collaboration, New World wineries are beginning to diversify their markets abroad as their production grows. Knowledge about the various market niches and the distributional networks in those foreign markets is expensive to acquire, however. would have found it more profitable to expand their crushing capacity in lower-priced countries rather than in Australia, thereby causing winegrape prices to tend to equalize across countries even though the grapes themselves are not traded internationally. Such developments help to keep profits of Australian-based multinational wine companies and targeted grape growers abroad higher than they otherwise would be, while lowering profits to Australian grapegrowers, other things equal. However, multinational wine corporations from abroad have invested in Australia, which has an offsetting, positive effect on Australian grapegrowers. The demands by all such wineries for ever-better performance from their contracted growers is an on-going stimulus for growers to seek out innovations.
Horizontal collaboration stimulated by the digital revolution is also occurring at the retail level. How are the savings from increased marketing efficiencies via supermarketing and e-commerce distributed between the consumer, marketer, winemaker and grapegrower? Wittwer and Anderson (2001) explored this question with a model of the world"s wine markets. They suggested that in the short run the innovative distributors would gain most but that, over time as competition among distributors and retailers drives down consumer prices, the gains would be shared among consumers and producers. Given even further time, the benefits to producers would encourage increased plantings and winemaking capacity such that consumers would end up with the lion"s share (all but one-eighth) of the benefits. That prediction certainly seems to be consistent with the experiences of the past decade in Australia.
Collaboration at the industry level: institutional innovation
In addition to collaboration to improve the efficiency of grape growing, wine making and wine marketing at the firm level, the Australian wine industry during the past two decades has enjoyed a high and envied degree of collaboration also at the industry level. The key It was developed to provide a 30-year vision for the future so as to stimulate a steady flow of investment. At the time the targets in that document were considered by many observers as rather optimistic, since they involved a three-fold increase in the real value of wine production, 55 per cent of it for the export market. Getting half way to those targets required having a crush of 1100 kt to produce 750 million litres of wine at a wholesale pre-tax value of A$3 billion (A$4/litre). Yet so convincing was that document, and so intense and rapid was the subsequent investment, that the industry was more than half-way towards most of its 30-year targets in just six vintages -and since then has had to deal with the challenge of finding new markets for that much larger output. By 2009 the national stock of unsold wine (exacerbated by the global financial crisis that began a year earlier) was so large that industry leaders began calling for up to 20 percent of vines to be pulled out. Even in that tense situation, though, the four peak industry bodies coordinated in releasing a considered report on the state of the industry and why such major adjustments are needed ).
Long-run strategic planning by firms and the industry is made easier with an active system of producer organizations. The Australian wine industry has an excellent system involving more than 80 organizations at the national, state and regional levels, with a welldeveloped hierarchy of interaction between them (see www.wineaustralia.com).
Among the four peak bodies is the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation (AWBC).
One of its tasks is to ensure that exported wine meets the product standards of the country of destination, so that the reputation of the industry as a whole is not jeopardised by any sub- Table 2 ). The latter intensity has since dropped as Australia"s wine production rapidly expanded, but it may be higher if the quality of publications were to be taken into account. In terms of research payoff, a benefit-cost study found that the 2002 portfolio of GWRDC research projects was expected to yield a 9:1 benefit/cost ratio, and that a sample of past Australians will bring back new ideas that can be exploited to good effect in Australia.
Innovation's role in the years ahead
The Australian wine industry, having expanded dramatically and become (along with Chile and New Zealand) the most export-focused in the world, is now facing a second generation of challenges. In addition to having to deal, like all other suppliers, with the current global recession-driven decline in demand, the supermarket revolution and climate change impacts on production, those challenges include a strong Australian dollar because of a mining boom driven by China"s rapid industrialization, a concern with the carbon imprint of shipping (especially bottled wine) long distances, and a fashion swing away from Australian wine abroad and at home (including the sudden growth in imports from New Zealand as that country too moves into a situation of excess supplies of wine).
To weather the industry"s present depressed economic conditions and return to prosperity, its producers and leaders have to place even more emphasis on innovation. The
Directions to 2025 strategy is one example of possible fresh approaches to generic promotion.
That national initiative is being supplemented by regional promotion campaigns (funded entirely by regional producer levies), and by the creation of a new grouping of "Australia"s First Families of Wine". The latter is made up of a dozen of the oldest family companies not listed on the stock exchange and hence not subject to the same financial "short-termism" of listed companies. Emphasis needs to be given to the quality and originality of Australia"s various fine wine regions and single-site labels. The need to diversify markets for Australian wine exports so as to reduce the reliance on four English-speaking countries is now evident, and generic promotion initially at least in markets such as China"s is likely to have a high payoff alongside the marketing (and possibly direct foreign investment) efforts of individual firms. Even earlier rewards are likely to be reaped from marketing into the now duty-free market of Hong Kong.
Such efforts on the demand side of the market need to be matched by equally strong initiatives on the supply side. The best producers will continue their tradition of innovating on the job, but an expansion of formal R&D investments also is needed. Australia"s R&D investments only very recently have reached the point of taking full advantage of the federal government"s dollar-for-dollar matching of national grower levies up to 0.5 percent of the gross value of production. Benefit-cost analyses suggest the level of investment could be expanded much more and still provide an attractive marginal rate of return to the industry, provided those funds are spent on research projects with the highest expected payoffs. The return in the next decade or so may be even higher than in the past, bearing in mind marketplace changes and long-term uncertainties such as climate change, water and other environmental policy reforms, and alcohol tax changes. That prospect has led the main producer organization to work with the industry"s R&D funding body to develop a new strategy for administering research and extension activities (GWRDC and WFA 2009).
Transgenic biotechnology offers much promise for accelerating the research discovery process, but consumer resistance to genetic engineering is limiting the exploitation of that opportunity (Pretorius and Hoj 2005) . The scope for collaboration across scientific disciplines could be exploited more, as could the scope for collaboration between scientists at the basic and applied ends of the spectrum, and between scientists in various countries. As one step toward that end, the University of Adelaide recently established its Wine 2030 research program (see www.adelaide.edu.au/wine2030), but many more such steps will be needed.
Meanwhile, if producers remain attuned to the market and flexible enough to respond to exogenous shocks such as currency re-alignments, macroeconomic downturns, changes in consumer fashions, or disease outbreaks, as well as to try promising new technologies as soon as they become available, their long-term prospects for a return to prosperity look good. But, as anybody who has studied the history of the wine industry knows, the only thing that is really certain is that this is an industry characterized by great uncertainty, ever-fluctuating fortunes, and in particular long periods of low profits following each boom in acreage. Source: Authors' derivation from data at www.awbc.com.au 
